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This study investigates the effect of directors and officers liability insurance (hereafter, D&O 
liability insurance) on audit effort of auditors. D&O liability insurance is a liability insurance 
payable to top executives of a company as indemnification for losses or litigation costs from the 
lawsuits. Companies carry D&O liability insurance for the purpose of protecting their directors 
and officers from the legal actions. However, according to prior studies, the managers of their 
companies with D&O liability insurance may become more risk seeker, and they take more risks 
for their decision. If D&O liability insurance causes more risks at the company, auditors for the 
companies may use the information of D&O liability insurance as a risk factor at the audit 
engagement. This study examines whether D&O liability insurance has a significant influence 
audit effort of auditors empirically. We use the mandatory disclosed Korean data of D&O liability 
insurance for testing the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. From the 
results, we find that auditors use D&O liability insurance information for setting the amount of 
audit effort. Also, both Big4 and Non-Big4 use D&O liability insurance as useful information.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper investigates the effect of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O liability insurance) 
on audit effort of auditors. D&O Liability insurance is a liability insurance payable to top executives 
of a company as indemnification for losses or litigation costs from the lawsuits, and companies carry 
D&O liability insurance for protecting their directors and officers from the lawsuits. Therefore, D&O liability 
insurance is a safeguard to cover the monetary damage from litigation risks. However, carrying D&O liability 
insurance causes that managers become less risk averse. They are also less likely to reject attractive new risky 
projects with D&O liability insurance (Core, 1997). Moreover, in the case of abusing the insurance, managers may 
take more risks and exhibit more opportunism than managers without D&O liability insurance. Previous studies 
provide evidence that managers of companies with D&O liability insurance have more opportunity to engage in 
earnings management (Narjess, Nabil, and Martin, 2008). Also, in general, earnings management is more likely to 
occur in insured corporations than in uninsured corporations. In this circumstance, auditors may consider whether 
their clients are insured or uninsured as useful information for estimating clients’ audit risks. If auditors use the 
information of D&O liability insurance for considering that insured companies have higher potential litigation risk 
than uninsured companies, there is a positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. To test 
the association, we uses audit hours and audit fees as proxies for audit effort. 
 
Especially, Korean financial market provides a good research setting to examine the effect of D&O liability 
insurance on audit effort. First, D&O liability insurance is available in Korean setting because only Korean 
companies are required to disclose D&O liability insurance mandatorily until 2008 except Canada and Tawian 
companies. Next, since the establishment of the Securities Class Act in 2007, more than one third of Korean public 
companies carry D&O liability insurance and the demand of D&O liability insurance is sharply increased in Korea. 
Last, a few countires are required to disclose audit hours, but Korean companies are required to disclose both audit 
hours and audit fees to the public (Chun and Rhee, 2015). For the above reasons, Korean finanical market is an 
appropriate setting to investigate the effect of D&O liability on audit effort. 
T 
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This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there is no previous 
evidence on the direct positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort in Korea. This 
empirical evidence may shed a light on our understanding of managers’ incentives on D&O liability insurance. 
Second, this study provides insight into auditors’ belief about D&O liability insurance. Third, this study provides 
evidence that D&O liability insurance information is very meaningful to auditors. However, in Korea, disclosing 
D&O liability insurance information is not mandatory anymore after 2008. This study therefore suggests that policy-
makers should consider re-mandatory public disclosure of D&O liability insurance information for the market 
participants.  
 
Using 2,026 Korean firm-year observations during 2005 to 2008 period, this study finds that there is a 
positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. It implies that auditors input more audit hours 
and charge more audit fees to the companies with D&O liability insurance than the companies without the 
insurance. Also, audit hours and audit fees are increased as the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance 
is higher. The empirical results suggest that auditors use D&O liability insurance as useful information for 
evaluating their clients’ audit risk.  
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, background information and developing hypotheses 
are introduced. In Section 3, the sample and the research method are described and in section 4, our empirical 
findings are presented. Finally, in section 5, conclusions and implications from the findings are drawn.  
 
2.   BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Recently, many corporations have become concerned about the possibility of lawsuits from investors and 
outside parties. For the reason, more companies began to carry the D&O liability insurance. D&O liability insurance 
is a method by which top executives of the company protects themselves or their organizations from damage or 
defense costs due to criminal, civil, or administrative legal action. As a study of D&O liability insurance, Tillinghast 
(2002) reports that approximately 19% of U.S. survey respondents experienced more than one claims against their 
companies’ directors for a 10-year working periods, and all respondents’ companies carried D&O liability insurance. 
Thus, D&O liability insurance is very common to U.S. public companies. In Korea, D&O liability insurance has 
been adopted by a few companies since 1991, but it is not widespread because corporate litigation is not prevalent. 
However, since the establishment of the Securities Class Act in 2007, litigation against public companies in Korea 
has increased. Now, approximately 36% of Korean public companies carry D&O liability insurance. 
 
The main purpose of D&O insurance is to protect top executives of the company. However, when a 
company carries the insurance, it may affect managers’ opportunistic behaviors. Core (1997) reports that directors 
and officers become less risk averse. They are also less likely to reject attractive new risky projects. In this 
circumstance, by abusing the insurance, managers of insured companies can take more risks aggressively and exhibit 
more opportunism than managers of uninsured companies. Narjess et al. (2008) provide evidence that managers of 
companies with D&O liability insurance have more opportunity to engage in earnings management. If auditors use 
the information of D&O liability insurance for setting the amount of audit effort, there will be a positive association 
between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. In this study, audit hours and audit fees are used as proxies for 
audit effort. To investigate the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort, we set the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between audit effort and carrying D&O insurance. 
 
Managers choose insurance coverage limits depending on their litigation risk. When companies are at high 
risk of litigation, they select higher insurance coverage limits (Core, 1997; O’Sullivan, 2002; Fier, McCullough, 
Mansfield, and Gabel, 2012; Gillan and Panasian, 2014). When managers become entrenched or plan to invest in 
risky projects, they may extend their insurance coverage in order for maximum protection. We believe that the 
insurance coverage limit provides valuable information about the degree of litigation risk. Higher the insurance 
coverage limit of D&O insurance implies the higher the litigation risk. 
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Auditors are concerned about litigation risk from financial failure of their clients and the litigation risk 
cannot be completely eliminated due to clients’ business risk. Auditors determine the amount of their audit effort they 
will input using audit risk model (ARM). Unfortunately, the ARM model fails to capture the clients’ business risk 
because it focuses on the risk of material misstatement rather than the risk of financial failure (Houston, Peters, and 
Pratt, 1999). We believe that the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance reflects overall risk occurring 
due to misstatement, financial failure, internal control problems, or corporate governance better than the ARM. Using 
the information, auditors can adjust their audit effort to reduce the audit risk.  
 
Generally, companies consider their specific conditions such as level of litigation risks, financial status, and 
governance effects for purchasing D&O insurance. Thus, companies with D&O insurance may have different 
characteristics from companies without D&O insurance companies, and there may be a possibility of selection bias 
from total sample. Therefore, we sort the total sample into two groups: insured companies and uninsured companies. 
Then, we exclude uninsured companies to prevent the selection bias and examine the effect of D&O insurance using 
insured companies only. We state the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between the insurance coverage limit of D&O insurance and audit effort. 
 
3.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
The sample of companies in this study consists of Korean listed companies from 2005 to 2008 for which 
information about audit hours, audit fees, financial status, and D&O liability insurance coverage are available. To 
increase comparability, it selects companies that satisfy the following criteria (1) financial statement data with 
positive book value of equity available on the Korea Information Services Value (KIS-VALUE) database; (2) all of 
the proxies are available; (3) firms in non-financial industry; (4) fiscal year ended December 31. Financial data was 
collected from the Korea Information Services Value (KIS-VALUE) database and information about audit hours, 
fees, and D&O liability insurance were manually collected from each company’s audit reports and annual reports 
from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System of the Financial Supervisory Service (http:// dart.fss.or.kr). 
This process yields final sample of 2,026 annual firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the sample distribution of the 
final firm-year observations for the empirical tests.  
 
Table 1. Sample distribution 
Year Total sample firms Insured-companies Ratio of insured-company 
2005 412 136 33.01% 
2006 519 183 35.26% 
2007 535 197 36.82% 
2008 560 213 38.04% 
Total 2,026 729 35.98% 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Testing  
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The natural log of audit hours (LHOUR) and the natural log of audit fees (LFEE). 
  
Key Variables 
D&O An indicator variable that equals one when the company has D&O liability insurance and zero 
otherwise. 
LCOV Natural log of the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance 
  
Control Variables 
BIG4 An indicator variable that equals one when the audit firm is a Big4 auditor and zero otherwise. 
SIZE Natural log of the total assets. 
ROA Return on assets; ratio of net income to total asset. 
LEV Total leverage scaled by total assets. 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals one when the company’s net income is negative and zero 
otherwise. 
INVREC The sum of inventories and receivable divided by total assets. 
EXPRATIO The ratio oversea sales to total sales. 
DA Absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by Kothari et al. (2005). 
Year_Dummy Year dummy variables. 
Industry_Dummy Industry dummy variables. 
 
To estimate audit effort, audit hours and audit fees are used(Reynold et al., 2004; Rhee et al., 2012). The 
dependent variables are the natural log of audit hours (LHOUR) and the natural log of audit fees (LFEE). The 
variable of primary interest in this study is D&O insurance coverage. We assume that companies with D&O liability 
insurance have higher litigation risk than companies without D&O liability insurance. Therefore, the coefficient of 
the D&O insurance variable is expected to be positive. The Model (1) includes control variables that affect audit 
effort. In general, Big4 auditors (BIG4) spend more time and charge higher audit fees due to their reputation 
(Palmrose, 1986). With an increase in size of the client firm, the audit and litigation risk against the audit firm also 
increases (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Reynold and Francis, 2004). Variables representing profitability (ROA) 
and solvency (LEV and LOSS) are included, following the protocol in prior studies (Simunic, 1980; Reynold et al., 
2001; Ashbaygh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; Ge and Mcvay, 2005; Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007). To control for 
the complexity of client firms, two variables, INVREC and EXPRATIO, are included. When values for INVREC and 
EXPRATIO increase, the need for observation and verification of audit procedures also increases (Choi and Baek, 
1998; Park and Choi, 2009; Chun and Rhee, 2005). When earnings management is a strong possibility, as measured 
using the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA), auditors spend more time and charge higher audit fees. 
Finally, year and industry dummies are included to control for yearly and industry differences. To test hypothesis 2, 
LCOV is included as an independent variable instead of D&O insurance coverage. Other variables for testing of 
hypothesis 2 are the same as in Model (1). 
 
4.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A in Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the full sample. The mean of 
the natural log of audit hours (LHOUR) is 6.910. The mean of the natural log of audit fees (LFEE) is 18.303. The 
indicator variable, D&O, has a mean value of 0.356, implying that 35.6% of sample firms carry D&O liability 
insurance. The mean of BIG4 is 0.686, indicating that 68.6% of sample firms are audited by Big4 auditors. The mean 
of SIZE is 26.417. The average return on assets (ROA) is 0.032. The mean of leverage (LEV) is 0.443. The indicator 
variable, LOSS, has a mean value of 0.189, implying that 18.9% of sample firms have negative net income. The 
mean value for the ratio of the sum of inventory and accounts receivable to total assets (INVREC) is 0.274, and the 
mean value for the ratio of overseas sales to total sales (EXPRATIO) is 27.688. The mean of the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (DA) is 0.057. 
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Additionally, Panel B in Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in insured 
companies. The mean values for LHOUR and LFEE are 7.512 and 18.870, respectively. The variable of interest, 
LCOV, has a mean value of 4.359. In addition, 85.9% of insured companies are audited by Big4 auditors. The mean 
value for the size variable is 27.504. The mean values for ROA and LEV are 0.018 and 0.167, respectively. In 
addition, 15.4% of insured companies have negative net income. The mean values of INVREC and EXPRATIO are 
0.231 and 32.467, respectively. The mean value for DA is 0.056. All variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1% 
of the pooled data.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: full sample  
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
LHOUR 6.910 6.380 6.780 7.279 0.825 
LFEE 18.303 17.786 18.133 18.643 0.769 
D&O 0.357 0 0 1.000 0.479 
BIG4 0.686 0 1.000 1.000 0.464 
SIZE 26.417 25.351 26.084 27.231 1.500 
ROA 0.032 0.009 0.039 0.076 0.120 
LEV 0.443 0.295 0.453 0.586 0.197 
LOSS 0.189 0 0 0 0.391 
INVREC 0.274 0.166 0.266 0.375 0.149 
EXPRATIO 27.688 0.328 12.611 52.771 30.725 
DA 0.057 0.019 0.040 0.074 0.060 
 
Panel B. insured company sample 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
LHOUR 7.512 6.856 7.378 8.114 0.908 
LFEE 18.870 18.198 18.757 19.456 0.876 
LCOV 4.359 3.401 3.912 5.300 1.206 
BIG4 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.348 
SIZE 27.504 26.130 27.455 28.706 1.636 
ROA 0.018 0.012 0.046 0.087 0.073 
LEV 0.167 0.318 0.493 0.621 0.192 
LOSS 0.154 0 0 0 0.361 
INVREC 0.231 0.120 0.216 0.324 0.142 
EXPRATIO 32.467 0.352 23.860 59.676 32.917 
DA 0.056 0.018 0.040 0.077 0.058 
Note: LHOUR: natural log of audit hour; LFEE: natural log of audit fees; D&O: an indicator variable that equals one when the company 
has D&O liability insurance and zero otherwise; LCOV: natural log of the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance; BIG4: an 
indicator variable that equals one when the audit firm is a Big4 auditor and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of total assets; ROA: ratio of 
net income to total asset; LEV: total leverage scaled by total assets; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one when the company’s net 
income is negative and zero otherwise; INVREC: sum of inventories and receivable divided by total assets; EXPRATIO: the ratio of 
oversea sales to total sales; DA: absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results for testing hypothesis. This study examines the association between 
D&O liability insurance and audit effort. Audit hours and fees are used as proxies for audit effort. In column (1) of 
Table 3, the dependent variable is the natural log of audit hours (LHOUR). The coefficient of D&O is 0.198 (t = 
7.68), which is significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that when clients have D&O liability insurance, 
auditors perceive a higher litigation risk and therefore spend more time performing the audit in order to reduce their 
audit risk. The coefficients for BIG4, SIZE, and LEV are positive and significant, implying that these factors have a 
significant effect on audit hours. The coefficients for ROA and EXPRATIO are negative and not significant. Values 
for LOSS, INVREC, and DA are positive and not significant. In column (2) of Table 3, the dependent variable is the 
natural log of audit fees (LFEE). The coefficient of D&O is 0.146 (t = 6.94), which is significant at the 1% level, 
implying that when clients have D&O liability insurance, auditors charge higher audit fees because they perceive that 
insured companies have higher litigation risk than uninsured companies. Therefore, auditors charge higher audit fees 
as a risk premium. The coefficients of BIG4, SIZE, LEV, and LOSS are positive and significant, indicating that these 
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variables have a strong effect on audit fees. However, the coefficients of ROA, INVREC, EXPRATIO, and DA are 
insignificant, indicating that these variables have little effect on audit fees. These results imply that auditors use the 
information about D&O liability insurance when they determine their audit hours and fees. According to previous 
studies, companies with opportunistic managers and weak governance tend to purchase D&O liability insurance 
(Chalmers, Dann and Harford, 2002; Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011). Information about D&O liability insurance is 
therefore useful for prediction of litigation risk to third parties. 
 
Table 3. Results for hypothesis 1 
Variable LHOUR LFEE 
Intercept -3.614(14.74)*** 7.109(35.59)*** 
D&O 0.198(07.68)*** 0.146(06.94)*** 
BIG4 0.272(11.36)*** 0.083(04.26)*** 
SIZE 0.386(41.21)*** 0.412(54.01)*** 
ROA -0.164(-1.52) 0.045(00.52) 
LEV 0.117(01.90)* 0.303(06.04)*** 
LOSS 0.053(01.62) 0.047(01.79)* 
INVREC 0.036(00.42) 0.074(01.07) 
EXPRATIO -0.000(-0.69) -0.001(-3.08)*** 
DA 0.247(01.39) 0.119(00.82) 
Year Dummy Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included 
Number of observations 2,026 2,026 
Adj R. 0.696 0.768 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. 
See the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 4 presents the results of testing of the association between the insurance coverage limit of D&O 
insurance and audit effort. Insurance coverage limit indicates how much litigation risk companies cover. Therefore, 
auditors use information about D&O liability insurance as a proxy for estimating litigation risks. In column (1) of 
Table 4, the dependent variable is the natural log of audit hour (LHOUR). Our variable of interest is the insurance 
coverage limit of D&O insurance (LCOV). The coefficient of LCOV is 0.079(t=3.52), which is significant at the 1% 
level. In column (2) of Table 4, the dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees (LFEE), and the coefficient of 
LCOV is 0.110(t=5.70), which is significant at the 1% level. Through these results, this study provides evidence that 
auditors use insurance information when they provide auditing service. Auditors spend more time performing audits 
and charge higher audit fees when their clients has higher coverage limit of D&O insurance. Total number of 
observations for insured companies are 726 in the Table 1, but 30 of them fail to disclose insurance coverage limit. 
Finally, 696 observations are used for testing hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 4. Results for Hypothesis 2 
Variable LHOUR LFEE 
Intercept -4.697(-10.91)*** 6.660(18.03)*** 
LCOV 0.079(3.52)*** 0.110(5.70)*** 
BIG4 0.357(6.52)*** 0.123(2.60)*** 
SIZE 0.418(23.36)*** 0.414(26.97)*** 
ROA -0.370(-1.09) 0.507(1.75)* 
LEV -0.192(-1.68)* 0.141(1.43) 
LOSS 0.023(0.36) 0.042(0.76) 
INVREC 0.442(2.70)*** 0.449(3.19)*** 
EXPRATIO -0.001(-1.09) -0.002(-2.93)*** 
DA 0.251(0.79) 0.032(0.12) 
Year Dummy Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included 
Number of observations 696 696 
Adj. R 0.754 0.806 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. 
See the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
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4.4 Additional Test 
 
According to Table 2, 68.6% of companies in total sample hire Big4 auditors. Even though we include a 
control variable of BIG4, it is difficult to control the effects of Big4 auditors perfectly. In general, Big4 auditors 
spend more time and charge higher fees for their services due to their reputation (Palmrose, 1986). To remove the 
Big4 effect, we divide the sample into “companies audited by Big4 auditors” and “those not audited by Big4 
auditors”. In Table 5, columns (1) and (2) present the results of testing of the association between D&O liability 
insurance and Big4 auditors’ effort. In column (1), the dependent variable is audit hours (LHOUR). The coefficient of 
D&O is 0.202 (t = 6.66), which is significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the dependent variable is audit fees 
(LFEE). The coefficient of D&O is 0.136 (t = 5.70), which is significant at the 1% level. In columns (3) and (4), the 
results for the association between D&O liability insurance and Non-Big4 auditors’ effort are listed. In columns (3) 
and (4), the coefficients of D&O are 0.131 (t = 3.68) and 0.152 (t = 3.64), respectively, which are significant at the 
1% level. Both Big4 and Non-Big4 auditors spend more time and charge higher audit fees for insured companies due 
to their perception that the litigation risk is higher for the insured companies than for uninsured companies.  
 
Table 5. Results for additional test 
Variable BIG4 NON-BIG4 (1)LHOUR (2)LFEE (3)LHOUR (4)LFEE 
Intercept -4.125(-14.12)*** 6.391(27.83)*** 0.483(00.92) 10.901(24.24)*** 
D&O 0.202(06.66)*** 0.136(05.70)*** 0.131(03.68)*** 0.152(03.64)*** 
SIZE 0.414(37.80)*** 0.442(51.37)*** 0.228(11.17)*** 0.263(15.06)*** 
ROA -0.204(-1.26) 0.010(00.32) -0.108(-0.81) 0.067(00.58) 
LEV 0.069(00.85) 0.169(02.62)*** 0 .112(01.24) 0.374(04.83)*** 
LOSS 0.051(01.19) 0.057(01.68)* 0.024(00.51) 0.020(00.50) 
INVREC 0.129(01.15) 0.258(02.94)*** 0.061(00.49) -0.050(-0.47) 
EXPRATIO -0.000(-1.10) -0.000(-1.84)* 0.001(02.21)** -0.000(-0.71) 
DA 0.316(01.40) 0.149(00.84) 0.046(00.17) -0.049(-0.08) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
N. of obs. 1,389 1,389 637 637 
Adj. R 0.694 0.797 0.290 0.419 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. 
See the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. It provides evidences 
as to whether auditors use D&O liability insurance information when they set the amount of their audit effort. We 
find that auditors adjust their audit hours and fees when their clients carry D&O liability insurance. For clients with 
more expensive D&O liability insurance, auditors spend more time in order to minimize their audit risk and they also 
charge higher audit fees as a risk premium.  
 
This study, however, may have limitations under following caveats. First, there is the possibilities of that the 
empirical results are depended on measurement criteria or time period. There may be other omitted factors which 
bias the empirical results. Second, our firm-year observations are constrained by the availability of D&O liability 
insurance, and thereby it may contain a bias that the observations are toward relatively large firms where face higher 
litigation risks. Therefore, it is challenging to say that the results can be generalized into a broader set of 
observations.  
 
Despite these caveats, this study provides evidence that D&O liability insurance information is very 
meaningful and useful to auditors. D&O liability insurance is not mandatory disclosed as of 2008 in Korea. This 
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